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The twin-field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol and its variants are highly attractive because
they can beat the well-known rate-loss limit (i.e., the PLOB bound) for QKD protocols without quantum re-
peaters. In this paper, we perform a proof-of-principle experimental demonstration of TF-QKD based on the
protocol proposed by Curty et al. [38] which removes from the original TF-QKD scheme the need for post-
selection on the matching of a global phase, and can deliver nearly an order of magnitude higher secret key rate.
Furthermore, we overcome the major difficulty in the practical implementation of TF-QKD, namely, the need
to stabilize the phase of the quantum state over kilometers of fiber. A Sagnac loop structure is utilized to ensure
excellent phase stability between the different parties. Using decoy states, we demonstrate secret-key generation
rates that beat the PLOB bound when the channel loss is above 40 dB.
Keywords: quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution, twin-field quantum key distribution,
secret key rate, PLOB bound, phase encoding
Introduction - Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–5] makes it possible to distribute secret keys to remote users with
information-theoretic security, which means that its security is independent of an attacker’s computational power [6–15]. Exper-
imentally, QKD has been performed over 421 km of fiber [16], as well as over 1000 km of free space through satellite to ground
links [17, 18]. Towards the construction of a global quantum internet, performing long distance QKD is a crucial step [19–22].
However, there is a fundamental limit on the point-to-point secret key rate versus channel transmittance [23–25] that can be
achieved by two remote parties using QKD without an intermediate node. This limit, also called the PLOB bound [25], states
that the secret key rate scales basically linearly with the channel transmittance.
To overcome the PLOB bound, besides using quantum repeaters [26–29], it has been proposed to employ measurement-
device-independent (MDI) QKD [30] in combination with quantum memories [31, 32] or in combination with quantum non-
demolition measurements [33] located at the untrusted intermediate node that is used in MDI-QKD. While promising, all these
approaches are however far away from our current experimental capabilities. Remarkably, more recently it has been theoretically
proven [34–40] that variations of the twin-field (TF) QKD protocol proposed by Lucamarini et al. [41] can beat the PLOB bound
with the help of just one untrusted intermediate node (Charlie) performing a simple interferometric measurement. This shows
that intercity QKD could be feasible with todays technology without the need for quantum memories or quantum non-demolition
measurements. In TF-QKD, two users (Alice and Bob) send two optical fields to produce a single-photon interference on a beam
splitter located at Charlie. A successful result corresponds to Charlie observing a single-photon detection event, which measures
the relative phase between the two optical beams. The fact that TF-QKD uses singles (i.e. single-photon detection events) results
in a secret key rate that scales as the square-root of the channel transmittance instead of linearly. This is because only one photon
(either from Alice or from Bob) has to arrive at Charlie. Importantly, since TF-QKD has a similar structure as MDI-QKD, in the
sense that it uses an untrusted node to interfere Alice and Bobs signals, all the advantages of MDI-QKD [30–33, 42–46], such as
its immunity to any possible attack against the measurement unit and its readiness for star networks, are retained by TF-QKD.
In this regard, TF-QKD can be considered as a MDI-QKD scheme based on singles, rather than on coincidences.
With the foundations of TF-QKD firmly established, it is now very important to demonstrate the viability of TF-QKD exper-
imentally. One main drawback of the original TF-QKD protocol for practical implementations is that it requires long-distance
subwavelength path-length phase stability, which is a new requirement in QKD and is much more demanding to achieve than
two-photon interference as needed in standard MDI-QKD. Another drawback is that the original protocol requires to perform a
post-selection step based on the matching of a global phase between Alice and Bob, which results in a reduction of the secret key
rate by about an order of magnitude. To overcome these limitations, various variants of the original TF-QKD protocol have been
very recently proposed and investigated [34–40]. For example, ref. [34] analyzes the security of a modified TF-QKD scheme
by exploiting a quantum coin idea [10, 12]. Ref. [35], on the other hand, introduces a phase-matching QKD which releases the
requirement of active global phase randomization, but still needs a phase post-selection step. In Refs. [38–40] the need for such
post-selection step is removed. In summary, the security of some variants of TF-QKD have now been firmly established and
their key rates beat the PLOB bound. So, it is now important to implement experimentally a TF-QKD protocol to demonstrate
their practicality.
In this paper we perform a proof-of-principle experimental implementation of a TF-QKD protocol introduced by Curty et
al. [38]. This protocol does not need a post-selection step based on the matching of a global phase, and can provide a secret
key rate which is about an order of magnitude higher than previous proposals [47]. The key idea is to use coherent states
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2for key generation and photon number states as the complementary basis to prove security [14]. The latter type of states
can be simulated by means of phase-randomized coherent states in combination with the decoy-state method [48–51]. In our
experiment, to stabilize the phase of the quantum states over kilometers of fiber, an auto-compensating set-up, which provides
excellent phase stability, is built up. We remark that an auto-compensating set-up, also known as plug-and-play system, is widely
used in QKD [52, 53] and is the workhorse of a widely deployed commercial QKD system manufactured by the company ID
Quantique. Security proofs for such plug-and-play QKD systems have been developed in [54, 55]. More concretely, we use a
Sagnac loop where an optical pulse (generated by a single laser in our experiment) travels through either a clockwise path or
an anti-clockwise path and then the two paths interfere with each other. In one path, the pulse is modulated in phase by Alice
whereas in the other path, the pulse is modulated in phase by Bob. To implement the decoy-state method, intensity modulators
are employed to modulate the pulses leaving Bob and Alices stations. Our experimental results confirm an achievable secret key
rate well above the PLOB bound, and constitute a crucial step towards demonstrating the practical experimental feasibility of
TF-QKD.
Protocol and Experiment - The TF-QKD protocol introduced in [38] is composed of the following five steps.
Step 1: Each of Alice and Bob prepares a weak coherent state. Alice (Bob) chooses the X basis with probability PX and the
Z basis with probability PZ = 1 − PX . If the X basis is chosen, Alice (Bob) randomly prepares a coherent state |α〉A (|α〉B)
for the bit value bA = 0 (bB = 0) or |−α〉A (|−α〉B) for the bit value bA = 1 (bB = 1). If the Z basis is chosen, Alice (Bob)
prepares a phase-randomized coherent state
ρA =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dϕA
∣∣βAeiϕA〉A 〈βAeiϕA∣∣ (1)
(ρB has the same expression as (1) with all subscripts changed to B). The value of the intensity |βA|2 (|βB |2) is chosen at
random from a set S = {µ, ν, ω} containing say three possible intensities.
Step 2: Alice and Bob send their states to the middle node Charlie through optical channels, each of them with transmittance√
η.
Step 3: Charlie interferes the incoming states with a 50:50 beam splitter followed by two single-photon detectors, D0 and D1.
He records the result, i.e. which detector clicks at each expected arrival time slot.
Step 4: Once the quantum communication phase of the protocol has finished, Charlie announces all the results obtained, and
Alice and Bob declare the bases used.
Step 5: Based on the information announced, Alice and Bob estimate the bit and phase error rate and distill a secret key from
those instances where they used the X basis and Charlie declared one detection click. More precisely, whenever Charlie reports
one click event in say D0 (D1) and both Alice and Bob choose the X basis, bA and bB (bB ⊕ 1) are regarded as their raw keys.
Fig. 1 shows the schematic diagram of our experimental set-up. It is a two-way QKD system consisting of a Sagnac interfer-
ometer. It is similar to the plug-and-play QKD system employed in [52, 53]. The Sagnac arrangement is chosen to overcome
the main challenges in implementing TF-QKD, namely, to share a phase reference between Alice and Bob and to achieve
FIG. 1: Experimental set-up of twin-field quantum key distribution. The experiment starts by Charlie modulating the cw light from the laser to
create coherent pulses through his intensity modulator (IMC ). Then he uses the optical attenuator (AttC ) to prepare weak coherent pulses. The
pulses travel through a circulator (C) and enter the Sagnac loop by a 50:50 beam splitter (BS). The clockwise (counter-clockwise) traveling
pulse goes through another optical attenuator AttB (AttA) and, for some cases, a 5-km single mode fiber spool FB (FA) before reaching at
Bobs (Alices) station. Bob (Alice) then lets the pulse pass through his (her) station with no modulation and sends it to Alice (Bob) through a
7-km fiber spool FA−B . Once Alice (Bob) receives the pulse, she (he) uses her (his) phase modulator PMA (PMB) and intensity modulator
IMA (IMB) to add a phase to the pulse and modulate the intensity of the pulse respectively, based on her (his) choice of the basis and her (his)
bit value. Then Alice (Bob) sends the modulated coherent pulse back to Charlies BS through FA (FB) and AttA (AttB). Charlie records the
interference result by using two single photon detectors D0 and D1, and publicly announces the outcomes.
3single-photon interference at Charlie, which requires phase stability. The common-path nature of the Sagnac loop automatically
compensates for phase fluctuations of the two fields from Alice and Bob. In this set-up, the laser source is in Charlie’s hands
and is shared by Alice and Bob. This ensures that the three parties have the same phase reference. Charlie uses his intensity
modulator (IMC) and his optical attenuator (AttC) to create weak coherent pulses from a cw DFB laser (PRO 800, wavelength
1552.6 nm). The IMC has an extinction ratio of >30 dB. The pulses have a FWHM width of 900 ps and a repetition rate of 10
MHz. They go through an optical circulator and then enter the Sagnac loop through a 50:50 fiber-based beam splitter. Clock-
wise and counter-clockwise traveling pulses each go through an optical variable attenuator (and a 5-km fiber spool FB or FA
respectively in one case) before arriving at Alices or Bob’s station. The clockwise (counter-clockwise) pulses go through Bobs
(Alices) station without being modulated. Therefore, no information is directly communicated between Alice and Bob. The
clockwise (counter-clockwise) pulses then undergo a 7-km fiber spool FA−B and reach Alice’s (Bob’s) station. This is to ensure
that Alice and Bob are physically separated with kilometers of fiber. Inside the station of Alice (Bob), there is a phase modulator
PMA (PMB) and an intensity modulator IMA (IMB). If Alice (Bob) chooses the X basis, she (he) uses her (his) PMA (PMB) to
randomly add a 0 or pi phase to the pulse. If Alice (Bob) chooses the Z basis, then she (he) uses her (his) PMA (PMB) to add a
random phase between 0 and 2pi to the pulse. The intensity modulator is applied to set the average number of photons per pulse
to be, either |α|2 for the signal states in the X basis, or one of the intensities in the set S = {µ, ν, ω} for the decoy states in
the Z basis. After the phase and intensity modulations, Alice (Bob) sends the pulses through a variable optical attenuator and,
in some cases, through a 5-km spool of actual fiber FA (FB), before reaching the beam splitter of Charlie. The loss between
Alice (Bob) and Charlie is adjusted to simulate the loss due to the communication channel. To demonstrate the practicality of
the scheme, we add the 5-km fiber spool FA (FB) between Alice (Bob) and Charlie, in addition to the attenuator. The pulses
coming from Alice and Bob interfere at Charlies beam splitter. One output of this beam splitter is directed to a single-photon
detector (SPD) D0 via the circulator, while the other output is followed directly by another SPD, D1. The SPDs are commercial
free-run avalanche photodiodes (ID220) with an efficiency of 11.7% and a dark count rate of 750 Hz. The SPDs have a time
jitter on the order of 200 ps, matching the optical pulse width. Charlie records each click event (within a 900 ps window where
the detection is expected), and publicly announces the result. Afterward, Alice and Bob declare their bases choices and use the
instances where they both selected the X basis and Charlie announced a single-click event to distill a secure secret key.
Whether in Alices station or in Bobs station, both clockwise and counter-clockwise traveling pulses pass through the IM and
PM. It is crucial to ensure that Alice (Bob) only modulates the clockwise (counter-clockwise) traveling pulse. This is achieved by
using appropriate fiber lengths, between Alice (Bob) and Charlie and between Alice and Bob, so that the two counter propagating
pulses never overlap with each other at any modulator inside the Sagnac loop. Note that this is not a practical limitation, since in
practice Alice and Bob can measure the fiber lengths in the link and add or remove small lengths of fiber within their own set-up.
All modulators used in our set-up are driven and synchronized by a high-speed arbitrary waveform generator (AWG, Keysight
M8195A). The delay times of the driving signal of Alices (Bobs) IMA (IMB) and PMA (PMB), relative to the driving signal of
Charlies IMC , are well adjusted to ensure that Alice and Bob modulate the intended pulses. As in any practical system, there
are unintended reflections and backscattering from the channel, causing unintended clicks in the detectors. Fortunately, these
unintended signals do not arrive at the detectors at the same time as the signals from Alice and Bob. With precise synchronization,
we can eliminate the unintended clicks by choosing the appropriate time windows for detection in Charlie’s station. To further
reduce the errors in the detection results, the fiber lengths within Charlie’s station are adjusted to guarantee that the unintended
signals due to reflections / backscattering do not overlap with the real signals at the detectors, i.e., do not fall inside the detection
window.
A number of fiber-based polarization controllers are installed inside the Sagnac loop (see Fig. 1) to ensure that the pulses are
aligned in polarization after they travel through the entire loop and interfere at Charlies beam splitter. All the fiber spools are
stored in sealed boxes, but no active polarization stabilization is applied. The sealed boxes mimic the environment of buried
fiber cables. The voltage of the driving signal of Alices (Bobs) PMA (PMB) is tuned to Vpi (4.5V) to maximize the interference
visibility. Since the two pulses coming from Alice and Bob travel exactly the same path, they undergo the same phase drift and
their relative phase is therefore stable without active phase stabilization. Due to the combination of the aforementioned measures,
even after traveling kilometers of fiber, the interference visibility of our system is kept well above 99% for an extensive duration,
as shown in Fig. 2 (a). When the fiber spool FA (FB) is taken out of the loop and Alice (Bob) and Charlie is connected only
through an attenuator (blue squares in Fig. 2 (a)), the system is more stable and the average interference visibility is about
99.8%. When the 5-km fiber spool FA (FB) is added between Alice (Bob) and Charlie (red circles in Fig. 2 (a)), the interference
visibility is slightly lower compared to the cases without the fibers spools FA and FB . We attribute this degradation of the
visibility to polarization fluctuations, the depolarization effect, as well as low-levels of Rayleigh backscattering in long fiber
spools. Nonetheless, the interference visibility in this latter case is still stable for at least 40 minutes and the average value is
about 99.7%. In order to keep the high visibility and improve the performance of the system, we stop the experiment every 40
minutes for polarization realignment. When a random phase is required (for the decoy state signal), the voltage of the driving
signal is randomly chosen from 0 to Vpi . In this scenario, the photons should be detected by the detectors D0 and D1 with equal
probability. Fig. 2 (b) shows the ratio of the total number of photon counts at D0 to the total number of photon counts at D1
when phase randomization is applied continuously at both Alices and Bobs stations for 40 minutes. Note that the total number
of photon counts at detector D0 is calibrated to compensate for the circulator loss. As illustrated in Fig. 2 (b), both cases (with
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FIG. 2: (a) Interference visibility of the system running in 40 minutes. Each data point represents the average interference visibility in 30s. The
blue squares indicate the case in which Alice (Bob) and Charlie are connected only through an attenuator. While the red circles indicate the
case in which a 5-km fiber spool FA (FB) is added between Alice (Bob) and Charlie. For both cases, the system is stable and the interference
visibility is kept above 99.5%. (b) Ratio of the total number of photon counts at detector D0 to the total number of photon counts at detector
D1. Phase randomization is applied in 40 minutes. The total number of photon counts at detector D0 is calibrated to compensated the loss in
the circular. In this scenario, the photons should be detected by the detectors D0 and D1 with equal probability. Again, the blue squares (red
circles) represent the ratio without (with) 5-km fiber spool FA (FB) inserted between Alice (Bob) and Charlie. As expected, the ratio in both
cases is very close to 1.
Loss FiberInserted∗
Intensities
|α|2 µ ν ω
38.0 dB No 0.0256± 0.0001 0.087± 0.001 0.0088± 0.0002 (1.0± 0.2)× 10−4
46.7 dB No 0.02495± 0.00005 0.0978± 0.0008 0.0099± 0.0001 (7.5± 0.2)× 10−5
49.4 dB Yes 0.0183± 0.0001 0.02005± 0.00002 0.00828± 0.00007 (9.2± 1.0)× 10−6
55.1 dB No 0.0175± 0.0002 0.0382± 0.0004 0.00790± 0.00007 (6.5± 1.0)× 10−5
TABLE I: List of intensity sets for the four different values of the overall system loss 38.0 dB, 46.7 dB, 49.4 dB and 55.1 dB. |α|2 is the
average photon number (per pulse) of the coherent states in the X basis. µ, ν and ω are the average photon number (per pulse) of the decoy
states in the Z basis. The uncertainty of each intensity refers to the measurement of its statistical fluctuation. *: 5-km fiber spool FA (FB) is
inserted between Alice (Bob) and Charlie. Note that the fiber spool FA−B is fixed inside the loop for all the four cases to ensure that Alice and
Bob are physically separated with kilometers of fiber.
or without the 5-km fiber spools FA and FB) maintain a stable ratio close to 1, which indicates that phase randomization can be
effectively implemented.
Results and Discussion - We implement the experiment for four different values of the overall system loss between Alice and
Bob, 38.0 dB, 46.7 dB, 55.1 dB and 49.4 dB, respectively. Optical attenuators are applied to simulate the channel loss for the first
three system losses. For the 49.4 dB loss, 5-km fiber spools are inserted between Alice (as well as Bob) and Charlie in addition to
the attenuator. As discussed above, the detector efficiency is about 11.7%, which is equivalent to a 9.3 dB loss that we include in
the overall system loss. For different values of the system loss, we choose different intensity sets
{|α|2, µ, ν, ω}. The selection
of the signal intensity |α|2 is done by optimizing a priori the secret key rate formula for a channel model that approximately
simulates the expected behavior of an experimental realization, based on the devices parameters. In the asymptotic regime, given
that the weakest decoy intensity ω is sufficiently small, the selection of the other two decoy intensities µ and ν (within certain
limits) is not so crucial and its effect on the resulting secret key rate turns out to be small. So, we take the values of µ and ν
shown in Table I as an example and for experimental convenience.
For each value of the system loss and each intensity pair, Alice and Bob each send out 3 × 109 coherent pulses. The exper-
imental quantum bit error rates (QBER) observed in both detectors D0 and D1 when Alice and Bob choose X basis are listed
in Table II. Given the high stability of the system and the high interference visibility, the QBERs observed in the experiment
are correspondingly low. Even the maximum QBER observed at the highest system loss is lower than 1.2%. As the overall
system loss decreases, the impact of the dark counts of the single-photon detectors diminishes. This is reflected in the lower
5Loss Fiber Inserted∗ QBER Experimental Secret Key Rates PLOB Bound
D0 D1 Rmean Rmin Rmax
38.0 dB No 0.0032 0.0036 2.6484× 10−4 1.9917× 10−4 3.4765× 10−4 2.2867× 10−4
46.7 dB No 0.0058 0.0032 7.8389× 10−5 6.9058× 10−5 8.8458× 10−5 3.0845× 10−5
49.4 dB Yes 0.0059 0.0056 3.6306× 10−5 2.4061× 10−5 5.4130× 10−5 1.6564× 10−5
55.1 dB No 0.0116 0.0108 1.7542× 10−5 1.0516× 10−5 2.5652× 10−5 4.4584× 10−6
TABLE II: List of experimental results for the four different values of the overall system loss considered, 38.0 dB, 46.7 dB, 49.4 dB and
55.1 dB. QBER is the experimental quantum bit error rate observed at detectors D0 and D1 when Alice and Bob choose the X basis. The
experimental secret key rate includes three cases, i.e. the case where intensity fluctuations are disregarded and the worst and best case scenarios
where intensity fluctuations are taken into account. These three cases are indicated with the notation Rmean, Rmin and Rmax respectively.
Also, for comparison purposes, this table includes the PLOB bound [25] corresponding to each system loss. *: 5-km fiber spool FA (FB) is
inserted between Alice (Bob) and Charlie. Note that the fiber spool FA−B is fixed inside the loop for all the four cases to ensure that Alice and
Bob are physically separated with kilometers of fiber.
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FIG. 3: Secret key rate (per pulse) in logarithmic scale as a function of the overall loss between Alice and Bob. The results shown in Table II
are illustrated as black crosses. The vertical line of each cross shows the difference between the worst and best case scenarios when intensity
fluctuations are taken into account, i.e. the difference between Rmin and Rmax. The horizontal line of each cross shows the uncertainty of the
overall loss, which is ±0.1 dB for the cases 38.0 dB, 46.7 dB and 49.4 dB system loss, and ±0.2 for the case 55.1 dB system loss. The point
where these two lines cross coincides with the secret key rate if intensity fluctuations are disregarded, i.e. with Rmean in Table II. The solid
red line illustrates the PLOB bound introduced in [25]. The solid green line corresponds to a theoretical simulation result realised with the
channel model introduced in [38]. This channel model, for simplicity, assumes the same experimental parameters over all the distances and
does not optimise the values of the different decoy intensities which are fixed a priori. Still, the experimental parameters selected are similar to
those of the experimental implementation (though these change for each point) and thus also the resulting secret key rate is reasonable similar.
Most importantly, our results demonstrate clearly that the experiments performed beat the PLOB bound.
QBERs obtained for lower system loss. More experimental data, such as the experimentally observed gains, could be found in
the supplementary material [56]. To extract a secure secret key, we use the security analysis and secret key rate formula reported
in [38] (see supplementary material [56]). The secret key rates for different system losses, as well as the corresponding PLOB
bound, are also listed in Table II. For each value of the system loss, Table II includes three cases, i.e. the case where intensity
fluctuations are disregarded and the worst- and best-case scenarios where intensity fluctuations are taken into account. For the
worst- and best-case scenarios, we numerically minimize and maximize the secret key rate formula among all possible values
for the different intensities (within the reported experimental intervals which include the intensity fluctuations). These three
cases are indicated in the table with the notation Rmean, Rmin and Rmax respectively. These results are also illustrated in Fig. 3,
which shows the secure key rate (bits per pulse) in logarithmic scale as a function of the overall system loss. The solid red
line illustrates the PLOB bound introduced in [25]. The solid green line corresponds to a theoretical simulation result realized
with the channel model introduced in [38]. This channel model, for simplicity, assumes the same experimental parameters
(similar to those of the experimental implementation) over all the distances and does not optimize the values of the different
decoy intensities which are fixed a priori. The experimental secret key rates are illustrated as black crosses. The vertical line of
each cross shows the difference between the worst- and best-case scenarios when intensity fluctuations are taken into account,
6i.e. the difference between and Rmin and Rmax. The horizontal line of each cross shows the uncertainty of the overall loss.
The point where these two lines cross coincides with the secret key rate if intensity fluctuations are disregarded, i.e. with Rmean
in Table II. As depicted in Fig. 3, the experimental secret key rates are reasonably close to the theoretical simulation results,
except that the key rate at the system loss 49.4 dB is slightly lower compared with the simulation result. This is because of the
5-km fiber spools FA (FB) that are added in between Alice (Bob) and Charlie in this case, which reduces the performance of
the system. Nonetheless, the experimental results, as expected, follow the rate-loss dependence of TF-QKD, scaling with the
square-root of the channel transmittance. When the overall system loss between Alice and Bob is around 38 dB, the secret key
rate sits around the PLOB bound. However, as the overall system loss increases, the experimental key rate evidently surpasses
the PLOB bound even when the minimum key rate in the worst-case scenario is considered. This achievement experimentally
proves that TF-QKD can beat the fundamental bounds on the private capacity of point-to-point QKD. Particularly, the observed
higher key rate, compared with the PLOB bound, at loss 49.4 dB with real fiber spools (FA and FB) shows the feasibility of the
practical application of TF-QKD.
Conclusion - In summary, we have implemented the first twin-field quantum key distribution experiment over 10 km of real
optical fibers without active phase stabilization or phase post-selection. The secure key rate of the system scales as the square-
root of the overall channel transmittance. In particular, we have observed that the resulting secret key rate at the high loss
region clearly beats the PLOB bound even when intensity fluctuations are taken into account. Our work shows the feasibility of
overcoming the private capacity of a point-to-point QKD link with current technology. Longer fibers could be added into our
system in the future to extend the range of TF-QKD.
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I. SECRET KEY RATE FORMULA
We use the security analysis introduced in [1]. It states that a lower bound on the asymptotic secret key rate, R, can be written
as
R ≥ R10 +R01, (1)
where the terms RD0D1 , with (D0, D1) ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}, have the form
RD0D1 = max
{
p2Xp(D0, D1)
[
1− fEC ∗ h(eD0D1)− h(ephD0D1)
]
, 0
}
. (2)
The term pX denotes the probability that Alice (Bob) selects theX basis. In the asymptotic regime we assume that this probabil-
ity is very close to one and thus p2X ≈ 1 [1]. The parameter p(D0, D1), on the other hand, represents the conditional probability
that Charlie announces the measurement outcome (D0, D1) given that both Alice and Bob emit a signal state encoded in the X
basis. The case (D0, D1) = (1, 0) corresponds to observing a “click” only in detector D0, while the case (D0, D1) = (0, 1)
corresponds to observing a “click” only in detector D1 at Charlie. This probability can be expressed as
p(D0, D1) =
∑
bA,bB=0,1
p(bA, bB)p(D0, D1|bA, bB) = 1
4
∑
bA,bB=0,1
p(D0, D1|bA, bB), (3)
where bA = 0 (bA = 1) refers to Alice emitting the coherent state |α〉 (|−α〉), and similarly for bB . That is, p(bA, bB) denotes
the joint probability that Alice emits the signal state associated to bA and Bob that associated to bB . In Eq. (3) we have used
the fact that, in the experiment, p(bA, bB) = 1/4 ∀bA, bB . Similarly, p(D0, D1|bA, bB) denotes the conditional probability that
Charlie announces the measurement outcome (D0, D1) given that Alice and Bob emit, respectively, a signal state associated to
bA and bB . These probabilities can be estimated directly from the experimental data.
In Eq. (2), fEC is an inefficiency function for the error correction process. We fix fEC to a typical value, say fEC = 1.16 [1].
The function h(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) represents the binary Shannon entropy function, and the term eD0D1
denotes the quantum bit-error rate in the X basis. This last quantity can be expressed as
e10 =
∑
i,i|i⊕j=1 p(D0 = 1, D1 = 0|bA = i, bB = j)
4p(D0 = 1, D1 = 0)
,
e01 =
∑
i=0,1 p(D0 = 0, D1 = 1|bA = i, bB = i)
4p(D0 = 0, D1 = 1)
, (4)
where, again, we have used the fact that p(bA, bB) = 1/4 ∀bA, bB .
Finally, the quantity ephD0D1 which appears in Eq. (2) refers to an upper bound on the phase-error rate associated to the signals
in the X basis. This quantity satisfies [1]
ephD0D1 ≤
1
p(D0, D1)
{[
c20
√
Y U00,D0D1 + c0c2
(√
Y U02,D0D1 +
√
Y U20,D0D1
)
+ ∆
]2
+
[
c21
√
Y U11,D0D1 + ∆¯
]2}
, (5)
where the coefficients ci = e−
|α|2
2 αi/
√
i!, with α being the amplitude of the X basis signals, and where the residual parameters
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2∆ and ∆¯ are given, respectively, by
∆ =
∞∑
n,m=0
c2nc2m − c20 − 2c0c2,
∆¯ =
∞∑
n,m=0
c2n+1c2m+1 − c21. (6)
The quantities Y Unm,D0D1 , with (n,m) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 2), (2, 0), (1, 1)}, that appear in Eq. (5) refer to an upper bound on the
yields Ynm,D0D1 , which are the conditional probabilities that Charlie announces the measurement outcome (D0, D1) given that
Alice and Bob emit an n-photon state and anm-photon state, respectively. We estimate these quantities by using the experimental
data from the Z basis.
A. Estimation of Y Unm,D0D1
The parameters Y Unm,D0D1 can be estimated using either analytical or numerical tools. In this section we introduce an analyt-
ical method that we use to estimate these quantities. Our starting point is the experimentally observed gains, QabD0,D1 , of the Z
basis states, which are the conditional probabilities that Charlie announces the measurement outcome (D0, D1) given that Alice
(Bob) sent him a phase-randomised coherent state of intensity a (b), with a, b ∈ S = {µ, ν, ω}. We have that
QabD0,D1 = e
−a−b
∞∑
n,m=0
anbm
n!m!
Ynm,D0D1 . (7)
For convenience and in order to simplify the notation, below we shall denote the quantities QabD0,D1 and Ynm,D0D1 as Q
ab and
Ynm, respectively. That is, we will omit the dependence of these parameters with the detection pattern (D0, D1). Likewise, we
shall use Y Unm instead of Y
U
nm,D0D1
.
1. Estimation of Y U00
To upper bound the yield Y00 we use the result introduced in [2]. It states that
Y00 ≤ Y U00 ≡ min

ω2∆µν
µ−ν − ν
2∆µω
µ−ω +
µ2∆νω
ν−ω
(µ− ν)(µ− ω)(ν − ω) , 1
 , (8)
where the terms ∆µν , ∆µω and ∆νω have the form
∆µν = ν2e2µQµµ + µ2e2νQνν − µνeµ+ν(Qµν +Qνµ),
∆µω = ω2e2µQµµ + µ2e2ωQωω − µωeµ+ω(Qµω +Qωµ),
∆νω = ω2e2νQνν + ν2e2ωQωω − νωeν+ω(Qνω +Qων). (9)
2. Estimation of Y U11
To estimate Y U11 we proceed as follows. Let a1, a0 ∈ S, with a1 > a0, denote Alice’s intensities, and let b1, b0 ∈ S, with
b1 > b0, denote Bob’s intensities. Then, we have that
Γa1a0b1b0 ≡ ea0+b0Qa0b0 + ea1+b1Qa1b1 − ea0+b1Qa0b1 − ea1+b0Qa1b0 =
∞∑
n,m=0
(an1 − an0 )(bm1 − bm0 )
n!m!
Ynm. (10)
Since a1 > a0 and b1 > b0, we have that all the terms that multiply the yields Ynm in Eq. (10) are positive. This means, in
particular, that
Γa1a0b1b0 ≥ (a1 − a0)(b1 − b0)Y11, (11)
3which implies
Y11 ≤ min
{
Γa1a0b1b0
(a1 − a0)(b1 − b0) , 1
}
≡ YU,11. (12)
In addition, let a¯1, b¯1 ∈ S, with a1 > a¯1 > a0 and b1 > b¯1 > b0. Then, we have that
Ξa1a0b1b0a¯1b¯1 ≡ (a¯21 − a20)(b¯21 − b20)
[
ea1+b1Qa1b1 − ea1+b0Qa1b0 − ea0+b1Qa0b1 + ea0+b0Qa0b0]
−(a¯21 − a20)(b21 − b20)
[
ea1+b¯1Qa1b¯1 − ea1+b0Qa1b0 − ea0+b¯1Qa0b¯1 + ea0+b0Qa0b0
]
−(a21 − a20)(b¯21 − b20)
[
ea¯1+b1Qa¯1b1 − ea¯1+b0Qa¯1b0 − ea0+b1Qa0b1 + ea0+b0Qa0b0]
+(a21 − a20)(b21 − b20)
[
ea¯1+b¯1Qa¯1b¯1 − ea¯1+b0Qa¯1b0 − ea0+b¯1Qa0b¯1 + ea0+b0Qa0b0
]
=
∞∑
n,m=0
[(a¯21 − a20)(an1 − an0 )− (a21 − a20)(a¯n1 − an0 )][(b¯21 − b20)(bm1 − bm0 )− (b21 − b20)(b¯m1 − bm0 )]
n!m!
Ynm. (13)
From Eq. (13) we have that Ξa1a0b1b0a¯1b¯1 can be expressed as
Ξa1a0b1b0a¯1b¯1 = [(a¯21 − a20)(a1 − a0)− (a21 − a20)(a¯1 − a0)][(b¯21 − b20)(b1 − b0)− (b21 − b20)(b¯1 − b0)]Y11
+[(a¯21 − a20)(a1 − a0)− (a21 − a20)(a¯1 − a0)]
∞∑
m≥3
[(b¯21 − b20)(bm1 − bm0 )− (b21 − b20)(b¯m1 − bm0 )]
m!
Y1m
+[(b¯21 − b20)(b1 − b0)− (b21 − b20)(b¯1 − b0)]
∞∑
n≥3
[(a¯21 − a20)(an1 − an0 )− (a21 − a20)(a¯n1 − an0 )]
n!
Yn1
+
∞∑
n,m≥3
[(a¯21 − a20)(an1 − an0 )− (a21 − a20)(a¯n1 − an0 )][(b¯21 − b20)(bm1 − bm0 )− (b21 − b20)(b¯m1 − bm0 )]
n!m!
Ynm. (14)
Importantly, since a1 > a¯1 > a0, we have that (a¯21 − a20)(a1 − a0)− (a21 − a20)(a¯1 − a0) ≤ 0 and [(a¯21 − a20)(an1 − an0 )− (a21 −
a20)(a¯
n
1 − an0 )] ≥ 0 for all n ≥ 3.
To see this, let us start by considering the first inequality, i.e. (a¯21 − a20)(a1 − a0)− (a21 − a20)(a¯1 − a0) ≤ 0. This inequality
is equivalent to
(a¯21 − a20)
(a21 − a20)
=
(a¯1 − a0)(a¯1 + a0)
(a1 − a0)(a1 + a0) ≤
(a¯1 − a0)
(a1 − a0) . (15)
This implies that
(a¯1 + a0)
(a1 + a0)
≤ 1, (16)
which is true because a1 > a¯1.
Let us consider now the second inequality, i.e. [(a¯21 − a20)(an1 − an0 )− (a21 − a20)(a¯n1 − an0 )] ≥ 0 for all n ≥ 3. This statement
is equivalent to
(a¯21 − a20)
(a21 − a20)
=
(a¯1 − a0)(a¯1 + a0)
(a1 − a0)(a1 + a0) ≥
(a¯n1 − an0 )
(an1 − an0 )
=
(a¯1 − a0)(a¯n−11 + a¯n−21 a0 + a¯n−31 a20 + . . .+ a¯21an−30 + a¯1an−20 + an−10 )
(a1 − a0)(an−11 + an−21 a0 + an−31 a20 + . . .+ a21an−30 + a1an−20 + an−10 )
,
(17)
where, on the RHS of the inequality given by Eq. (17), we have used the fact that xn−yn = (x−y)(xn−1 +xn−2y+xn−3y2 +
. . .+ x2yn−3 + xyn−2 + yn−1). This means that Eq. (17) can be written as
(a¯1 + a0)
(a1 + a0)
≥ (a¯
n−1
1 + a¯
n−2
1 a0 + a¯
n−3
1 a
2
0 + . . .+ a¯
2
1a
n−3
0 + a¯1a
n−2
0 + a
n−1
0 )
(an−11 + a
n−2
1 a0 + a
n−3
1 a
2
0 + . . .+ a
2
1a
n−3
0 + a1a
n−2
0 + a
n−1
0 )
. (18)
After some straightforward calculations we obtain that Eq. (18) implies
(a¯1a
2
1 + a0a
2
1)(a
n−3
1 + a
n−4
1 a0 + a
n−5
1 a
2
0 + . . .+ a1a
n−4
0 + a
n−3
0 ) ≥ (a1a¯21 + a0a¯21)(a¯n−31 + a¯n−41 a0 + a¯n−51 a20
+ . . .+ a¯1a
n−4
0 + a
n−3
0 ). (19)
4Then, since a1 > a¯1, we find that (a¯1a21 + a0a
2
1) ≥ (a1a¯21 + a0a¯21) and (an−31 + an−41 a0 + an−51 a20 + . . .+ a1an−40 + an−30 ) ≥
(a¯n−31 + a¯
n−4
1 a0 + a¯
n−5
1 a
2
0 + . . .+ a¯1a
n−4
0 + a
n−3
0 ), which confirms that Eq. (19) also holds.
From the results above it follows directly that (b¯21 − b20)(b1 − b0)− (b21 − b20)(b¯1 − b0) ≤ 0 and [(b¯21 − b20)(bm1 − bm0 )− (b21 −
b20)(b¯
m
1 − bm0 )] ≥ 0 for all m ≥ 3 whenever b1 > b¯1 > b0.
This means that in Eq. (14) the terms that multiply the yields Y11 and Ynm with n,m ≥ 3 are greater or equal to zero, while the
terms that multiply the yields Y1m and Yn1 with n,m ≥ 3 are smaller or equal to zero. We obtain, therefore, that the parameter
Ξa1a0b1b0a¯1b¯1 is lower bounded by
Ξa1a0b1b0a¯1b¯1 ≥ [(a¯21 − a20)(a1 − a0)− (a21 − a20)(a¯1 − a0)][(b¯21 − b20)(b1 − b0)− (b21 − b20)(b¯1 − b0)]Y11 + ζa1a0b1b0a¯1b¯1 ,
(20)
where the quantity ζa1a0b1b0a¯1b¯1 is given by
ζa1a0b1b0a¯1b¯1 = [(a¯21 − a20)(a1 − a0)− (a21 − a20)(a¯1 − a0)]
∞∑
m≥3
[(b¯21 − b20)(bm1 − bm0 )− (b21 − b20)(b¯m1 − bm0 )]
m!
+[(b¯21 − b20)(b1 − b0)− (b21 − b20)(b¯1 − b0)]
∞∑
n≥3
[(a¯21 − a20)(an1 − an0 )− (a21 − a20)(a¯n1 − an0 )]
n!
= [(a¯21 − a20)(a1 − a0)− (a21 − a20)(a¯1 − a0)]
{
(b¯21 − b20)
[
b0 +
b20
2
− b1
2
(2 + b1)− eb0 + eb1
]
−(b21 − b20)
[
b0 +
b20
2
− b¯1
2
(2 + b¯1)− eb0 + eb¯1
]}
+ [(b¯21 − b20)(b1 − b0)− (b21 − b20)(b¯1 − b0)]{
(a¯21 − a20)
[
a0 +
a20
2
− a1
2
(2 + a1)− ea0 + ea1
]
− (a21 − a20)
[
a0 +
a20
2
− a¯1
2
(2 + a¯1)− ea0 + ea¯1
]}
.
(21)
We find, therefore, that
Y11 ≤ min
{
Ξa1a0b1b0a¯1b¯1 − ζa1a0b1b0a¯1b¯1
[(a¯21 − a20)(a1 − a0)− (a21 − a20)(a¯1 − a0)][(b¯21 − b20)(b1 − b0)− (b21 − b20)(b¯1 − b0)]
, 1
}
≡ Y ′U,11. (22)
This means that
Y11 ≤ Y U11 ≡ min
{
YU,11, Y
′
U,11
}
. (23)
3. Estimation of Y U02
Let the parameter Ωa1a0b1b0b¯1 , with a1 > a0 and b1 > b¯1 > b0, be defined as
Ωa1a0b1b0b¯1 ≡ (b1 − b¯1)
[
a1e
a0+b0Qa0b0 − a0ea1+b0Qa1b0
]
+ (b1 − b0)
[
a0e
a1+b¯1Qa1b¯1 − a1ea0+b¯1Qa0b¯1
]
+(b¯1 − b0)
[
a1e
a0+b1Qa0b1 − a0ea1+b1Qa1b1
]
=
∞∑
n,m=0
(an0a1 − a0an1 )
[
(b¯1 − b0)(bm1 − bm0 )− (b1 − b0)(b¯m1 − bm0 )
]
n!m!
Ynm
=
(a1 − a0)(b1 − b0)(b¯1 − b0)(b1 − b¯1)
2
Y02 + (a1 − a0)
∞∑
m≥3
(b¯1 − b0)(bm1 − bm0 )− (b1 − b0)(b¯m1 − bm0 )
m!
Y0m
+
∞∑
n,m≥2
(an0a1 − a0an1 )
[
(b¯1 − b0)(bm1 − bm0 )− (b1 − b0)(b¯m1 − bm0 )
]
n!m!
Ynm. (24)
Since a1 > a0 and b1 > b¯1 > b0, we have that the terms (b¯1 − b0)(bm1 − bm0 ) − (b1 − b0)(b¯m1 − bm0 ) ≥ 0 for all m ≥ 2. To
demonstrate this, note that this statement is equivalent to
(b¯1 − b0)
(b1 − b0) ≥
(b¯m1 − bm0 )
(bm1 − bm0 )
=
(b¯1 − b0)(b¯n−11 + b¯n−21 b0 + b¯n−31 b20 + . . .+ b¯21bn−30 + b¯1bn−20 + bn−10 )
(b1 − b0)(bn−11 + bn−21 b0 + bn−31 b20 + . . .+ b21bn−30 + b1bn−20 + bn−10 )
. (25)
5This implies that
1 ≥ (b¯
n−1
1 + b¯
n−2
1 b0 + b¯
n−3
1 b
2
0 + . . .+ b¯
2
1b
n−3
0 + b¯1b
n−2
0 + b
n−1
0 )
(bn−11 + b
n−2
1 b0 + b
n−3
1 b
2
0 + . . .+ b
2
1b
n−3
0 + b1b
n−2
0 + b
n−1
0 )
, (26)
which is true because b1 > b¯1.
We find, therefore, that in Eq. (24) the terms that multiply the yields Y0m with m ≥ 2 are greater or equal to zero, while those
that multiply the yields Ynm with n,m ≥ 2 are smaller or equal to zero because the terms an0a1 − a0an1 are smaller than zero.
This means that
Ωa1a0b1b0b¯1 ≥ (a1 − a0)(b1 − b0)(b¯1 − b0)(b1 − b¯1)
2
Y02
+
∞∑
n,m≥2
(an0a1 − a0an1 )
[
(b¯1 − b0)(bm1 − bm0 )− (b1 − b0)(b¯m1 − bm0 )
]
n!m!
=
(a1 − a0)(b1 − b0)(b¯1 − b0)(b1 − b¯1)
2
Y02 + λ
a1a0b1b0b¯1 , (27)
where the parameter λa1a0b1b0b¯1 is given by
λa1a0b1b0b¯1 = [a0(1− ea1)− a1(1− ea0)] [(b¯1 − b0)(b0 − b1 − eb0 + eb1)− (b1 − b0)(b0 − b¯1 − eb0 + eb¯1)]. (28)
This implies that
Y02 ≤ Y U02 ≡ min
 2
[
Ωa1a0b1b0b¯1 − λa1a0b1b0b¯1
]
(a1 − a0)(b1 − b0)(b¯1 − b0)(b1 − b¯1)
, 1
 . (29)
4. Estimation of Y U20
Similarly, let the quantity Λa1a0b1b0a¯1 be defined as
Λa1a0b1b0a¯1 ≡ (a1 − a¯1)
[
b1e
a0+b0Qa0b0 − b0ea0+b1Qa0b1
]
+ (a1 − a0)
[
b0e
a¯1+b1Qa¯1b1 − b1ea¯1+b0Qa¯1b0
]
+(a¯1 − a0)
[
b1e
a1+b0Qa1b0 − b0ea1+b1Qa1b1
]
=
∞∑
n,m=0
[(a¯1 − a0)(an1 − an0 )− (a1 − a0)(a¯n1 − an0 )] (bm0 b1 − b0bm1 )
n!m!
Ynm
=
(a1 − a0)(a¯1 − a0)(a1 − a¯1)(b1 − b0)
2
Y20 + (b1 − b0)
∞∑
n≥3
(a¯1 − a0)(an1 − an0 )− (a1 − a0)(a¯n1 − an0 )
n!
Yn0
+
∞∑
n,m≥2
[(a¯1 − a0)(an1 − an0 )− (a1 − a0)(a¯n1 − an0 )] (bm0 b1 − b0bm1 )
n!m!
Ynm. (30)
By using exactly the same reasoning employed in the previous section, we have that whenever a1 > a¯1 > a0 and b1 > b0,
the terms that multiply the yields Yn0 with n ≥ 2 are greater or equal to zero, while those that multiply the yields Ynm with
n,m ≥ 2 are smaller or equal to zero because the terms bm0 b1 − b0bm1 are smaller than zero. This means that
Λa1a0b1b0a¯1 ≥ (a1 − a0)(a¯1 − a0)(a1 − a¯1)(b1 − b0)
2
Y20
+
∞∑
n,m≥2
[(a¯1 − a0)(an1 − an0 )− (a1 − a0)(a¯n1 − an0 )] (bm0 b1 − b0bm1 )
n!m!
=
(a1 − a0)(a¯1 − a0)(a1 − a¯1)(b1 − b0)
2
Y20 + τ
a1a0b1b0a¯1 , (31)
where the parameter τa1a0b1b0a¯1 is given by
τa1a0b1b0a¯1 = [(a¯1 − a0)(a0 − a1 − ea0 + ea1)− (a1 − a0)(a0 − a¯1 − ea0 + ea¯1)]
[
b0(1− eb1)− b1(1− eb0)
]
. (32)
6This implies that
Y20 ≤ Y U20 ≡ min
{
2
[
Λa1a0b1b0a¯1 − τa1a0b1b0a¯1]
(a1 − a0)(a¯1 − a0)(a1 − a¯1)(b1 − b0) , 1
}
. (33)
II. EVALUATION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL DATA
Table I shows the values of the parameters p(D0, D1), eD0D1 , Y
U
nm,D0D1
, ephD0D1 andRD0D1 , with (D0, D1) ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}
and (n,m) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 2), (2, 0), (1, 1)}, for four different values of the overall system loss, 38.0 dB, 46.7 dB, 49.4 dB and
55.1 dB. As described in the main text, in the case of 49.4 dB system loss, a 5-km fiber spool is inserted between Alice (Bob)
and Charlie in addition to the attenuator.
The parameters p(D0, D1) and eD0D1 are directly obtained from the experimental data in Table II corresponding to the signals
in the X basis by using Eqs. (3)-(4). The quantities Y Unm,D0D1 , with (n,m) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 2), (2, 0), (1, 1)}, are calculated by
means of Eqs. (8)-(23)-(29)-(33) together with the experimentally observed gains QabD0,D1 provided in Table III, with a, b ∈ S =
{µ, ν, ω}, corresponding to the signals in the Z basis. Finally, the phase error rate ephD0D1 is obtained by using Eq. (5), while the
secret key rate RD0D1 is evaluated by using Eq. (2).
For each value of the overall system loss, Table I considers three different cases. The first one refers to the situation where
we disregard the intensity fluctuations of the laser source. That is, the signal intensity |α|2 and the decoy intensities µ, ν and
ω correspond to the mean values reported in Table I in the main text. The second (third) case refers to the situation where we
consider intensity fluctuations and take as signal intensity and decoy intensities those, within the intervals reported in Table I
in the main text, that minimise (maximise) the resulting key rate. That is, here we take the worst (best) case scenario that is
compatible with our experimental data if intensity fluctuations are taken into account. These three cases are indicated in the table
with the notationRD0D1 , minµ,ν,ω RD0D1 and maxµ,ν,ω RD0D1 , respectively, and they refer to the quantitiesRmean, Rmin and
Rmax presented in the main text.
The final secret key rate given by Eq. (1), i.e. R10 + R01, is shown in Table IV for the four different values of the overall
system loss considered. For each value of the system loss, this Table includes the three cases mentioned above, i.e. the case
where intensity fluctuations are disregarded and the worst and best case scenarios when intensity fluctuations are taken into
account. Also, for comparison purposes, Table IV includes the PLOB bound [3], which reads− log2 (1− η), being η the system
transmittance. These results are also illustrated in Fig.3 in the main text.
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7Loss: 38.0 dB p(D0, D1) eD0D1 Y
U
00,D0D1 Y
U
11,D0D1 Y
U
02,D0D1 Y
U
20,D0D1 e
ph
D0D1
RD0D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 3.1823e-04 3.2080e-03 5.8083e-07 8.6573e-03 1.9756e-02 1.3268e-02 1.3273e-01 1.2695e-04
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 3.1465e-04 3.5903e-03 4.3238e-07 2.6890e-03 2.0288e-02 1.3618e-02 1.1743e-01 1.3789e-04
Loss: 38.0 dB p(D0, D1) eD0D1 Y
U
00,D0D1 Y
U
11,D0D1 Y
U
02,D0D1 Y
U
20,D0D1 e
ph
D0D1
minµ,ν,ω RD0D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 3.1823e-04 3.2080e-03 8.7112e-07 8.6774e-03 2.6093e-02 1.9702e-02 1.7313e-01 9.5152e-05
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 3.1465e-04 3.5903e-03 7.2132e-07 2.5793e-03 2.6566e-02 2.0110e-02 1.5803e-01 1.0402e-04
Loss: 38.0 dB p(D0, D1) eD0D1 Y
U
00,D0D1 Y
U
11,D0D1 Y
U
02,D0D1 Y
U
20,D0D1 e
ph
D0D1
maxµ,ν,ω RD0D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 3.1823e-04 3.2080e-03 2.7357e-07 8.6353e-03 1.3446e-02 6.8554e-03 9.1286e-02 1.6645e-04
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 3.1465e-04 3.5903e-03 1.2649e-07 2.7937e-03 1.4037e-02 7.1457e-03 7.4989e-02 1.8120e-04
Loss: 46.7 dB p(D0, D1) eD0D1 Y
U
00,D0D1 Y
U
11,D0D1 Y
U
02,D0D1 Y
U
20,D0D1 e
ph
D0D1
RD0D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 1.1625e-04 5.8043e-03 6.9776e-07 4.6722e-04 6.0460e-03 5.6272e-03 1.4675e-01 3.9369e-05
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 1.1614e-04 3.1767e-03 4.0039e-07 2.1468e-03 6.7111e-03 6.3392e-03 1.5744e-01 3.9020e-05
Loss: 46.7 dB p(D0, D1) eD0D1 Y
U
00,D0D1 Y
U
11,D0D1 Y
U
02,D0D1 Y
U
20,D0D1 e
ph
D0D1
minµ,ν,ω RD0D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 1.1625e-04 5.8043e-03 7.1132e-07 4.6995e-04 7.1038e-03 6.6833e-03 1.6413e-01 3.4434e-05
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 1.1614e-04 3.1767e-03 4.1421e-07 2.1339e-03 7.7372e-03 7.3834e-03 1.7365e-01 3.4624e-05
Loss: 46.7 dB p(D0, D1) eD0D1 Y
U
00,D0D1 Y
U
11,D0D1 Y
U
02,D0D1 Y
U
20,D0D1 e
ph
D0D1
maxµ,ν,ω RD0D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 1.1625e-04 5.8043e-03 6.8392e-07 4.6456e-04 5.0054e-03 4.5882e-03 1.2930e-01 4.4729e-05
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 1.1614e-04 3.1767e-03 3.8627e-07 2.1591e-03 5.7019e-03 5.3122e-03 1.4129e-01 4.3729e-05
Loss: 49.4 dB p(D0, D1) eD0D1 Y
U
00,D0D1 Y
U
11,D0D1 Y
U
02,D0D1 Y
U
20,D0D1 e
ph
D0D1
RD0D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 6.3155e-05 5.9033e-03 6.7859e-07 1.7455e-04 3.3325e-03 1.0892e-02 1.6311e-01 1.8804e-05
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 6.2834e-05 5.6327e-03 6.2168e-07 1.7629e-05 4.8162e-03 1.0738e-02 1.7243e-01 1.7502e-05
Loss: 49.4 dB p(D0, D1) eD0D1 Y
U
00,D0D1 Y
U
11,D0D1 Y
U
02,D0D1 Y
U
20,D0D1 e
ph
D0D1
minµ,ν,ω RD0D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 6.3155e-05 5.9033e-03 6.8242e-07 1.6076e-04 6.1573e-03 1.3737e-02 2.1087e-01 1.2397e-05
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 6.2834e-05 5.6327e-03 6.2551e-07 2.4009e-06 7.6507e-03 1.3592e-02 2.1780e-01 1.1664e-05
Loss: 49.4 dB p(D0, D1) eD0D1 Y
U
00,D0D1 Y
U
11,D0D1 Y
U
02,D0D1 Y
U
20,D0D1 e
ph
D0D1
maxµ,ν,ω RD0D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 6.3155e-05 5.9033e-03 6.7464e-07 1.8810e-04 5.0816e-04 8.0483e-03 1.0493e-01 2.8736e-05
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 6.2834e-05 5.6327e-03 6.1773e-07 3.2598e-05 1.9822e-03 7.8855e-03 1.2290e-01 2.5394e-05
Loss: 55.1 dB p(D0, D1) eD0D1 Y
U
00,D0D1 Y
U
11,D0D1 Y
U
02,D0D1 Y
U
20,D0D1 e
ph
D0D1
RD0D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 3.1489e-05 1.1575e-02 5.9412e-07 2.0453e-04 8.1004e-04 2.5307e-03 1.3355e-01 1.0305e-05
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 3.1287e-05 1.0779e-02 5.0726e-07 1.2045e-03 1.3736e-03 3.8711e-03 1.7501e-01 7.2368e-06
Loss: 55.1 dB p(D0, D1) eD0D1 Y
U
00,D0D1 Y
U
11,D0D1 Y
U
02,D0D1 Y
U
20,D0D1 e
ph
D0D1
minµ,ν,ω RD0D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 3.1489e-05 1.1575e-02 6.1349e-07 1.9917e-04 2.0477e-03 3.7849e-03 1.8536e-01 6.3829e-06
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 3.1287e-05 1.0779e-02 5.2613e-07 1.2114e-03 2.6295e-03 5.1510e-03 2.2447e-01 4.1328e-06
Loss: 55.1 dB p(D0, D1) eD0D1 Y
U
00,D0D1 Y
U
11,D0D1 Y
U
02,D0D1 Y
U
20,D0D1 e
ph
D0D1
maxµ,ν,ω RD0D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 3.1489e-05 1.1575e-02 5.7419e-07 2.0888e-04 3.4223e-04 1.3150e-03 9.6353e-02 1.3762e-05
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 3.1287e-05 1.0779e-02 4.8784e-07 1.1974e-03 1.5638e-04 2.6310e-03 1.1687e-01 1.1890e-05
TABLE I: Parameters p(D0, D1), eD0D1 , Y
U
nm,D0D1 , e
ph
D0D1
and RD0D1 , with (D0, D1) ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)} and (n,m) ∈
{(0, 0), (0, 2), (2, 0), (1, 1)}, for the four different values of the overall system loss, 38.0 dB, 46.7 dB, 49.4 dB and 55.1 dB. For each value of
the loss, we consider three different cases. The first one refers to the situation where we disregard the intensity fluctuations of the laser source,
and the signal intensity |α|2 and the decoy intensities µ, ν and ω take the mean values reported in Table I in the main text. The second (third)
case refers to the situation where we consider intensity fluctuations and take as signal intensity and decoy intensities those, within the intervals
reported in Table I in the main text, that minimise (maximise) the resulting secret key rate. These three cases are indicated in the table with the
notation RD0D1 , minµ,ν,ω RD0D1 and maxµ,ν,ω RD0D1 , respectively.
8Loss: 38.0 dB p(D0, D1|0, 0) p(D0, D1|0, 1) p(D0, D1|1, 0) p(D0, D1|1, 1)
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 6.3640e-04 2.1371e-06 1.9464e-06 6.3243e-04
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 1.7688e-06 6.2597e-04 6.2811e-04 2.7500e-06
Loss: 46.7 dB p(D0, D1|0, 0) p(D0, D1|0, 1) p(D0, D1|1, 0) p(D0, D1|1, 1)
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 2.3120e-04 1.2768e-06 1.4222e-06 2.3110e-04
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 6.8021e-06 2.3240e-04 2.3070e-04 7.9559e-07
Loss: 49.4 dB p(D0, D1|0, 0) p(D0, D1|0, 1) p(D0, D1|1, 0) p(D0, D1|1, 1)
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 1.2588e-04 7.5870e-07 7.3259e-07 1.2525e-04
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 7.2435e-07 1.2426e-04 1.2566e-04 6.9136e-07
Loss: 55.1 dB p(D0, D1|0, 0) p(D0, D1|0, 1) p(D0, D1|1, 0) p(D0, D1|1, 1)
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 6.2307e-05 6.9891e-07 7.5904e-07 6.2172e-05
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 5.9439e-07 6.1977e-05 6.1837e-05 7.5494e-07
TABLE II: Experimentally observed conditional probabilities p(D0, D1|bA, bB) of the signals in the X basis for the four different values of
the overall system loss 38.0 dB, 46.7 dB, 49.4 dB and 55.1 dB, with bA, bB ∈ {0, 1} and (D0, D1) ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}.
Loss: 38.0 dB QµaµbD0,D1 Q
µaνb
D0,D1
Q
µaωb
D0,D1
Q
νaµb
D0,D1
Q
νaνb
D0,D1
Q
νaωb
D0,D1
Q
ωaµb
D0,D1
Q
ωaνb
D0,D1
Q
ωaωb
D0,D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 1.1152e-03 6.3327e-04 5.7783e-04 6.2982e-04 1.1385e-04 5.9743e-05 5.7480e-04 5.7231e-05 1.8793e-06
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 1.0701e-03 6.2515e-04 5.8166e-04 6.1052e-04 1.0991e-04 5.9878e-05 5.6856e-04 5.6217e-05 1.7243e-06
Loss: 46.7 dB QµaµbD0,D1 Q
µaνb
D0,D1
Q
µaωb
D0,D1
Q
νaµb
D0,D1
Q
νaνb
D0,D1
Q
νaωb
D0,D1
Q
ωaµb
D0,D1
Q
ωaνb
D0,D1
Q
ωaωb
D0,D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 4.5761e-04 2.5417e-04 2.3487e-04 2.5735e-04 4.6880e-05 2.3929e-05 2.3521e-04 2.3785e-05 1.0445e-06
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 4.5244e-04 2.5600e-04 2.4247e-04 2.5418e-04 4.6128e-05 2.4302e-05 2.3851e-04 2.3707e-05 7.5364e-07
Loss: 49.4 dB QµaµbD0,D1 Q
µaνb
D0,D1
Q
µaωb
D0,D1
Q
νaµb
D0,D1
Q
νaνb
D0,D1
Q
νaωb
D0,D1
Q
ωaµb
D0,D1
Q
ωaνb
D0,D1
Q
ωaωb
D0,D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 6.8797e-05 4.9190e-05 3.5635e-05 4.8705e-05 2.8489e-05 1.4768e-05 3.5312e-05 1.4998e-05 7.0984e-07
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 6.8811e-05 4.9155e-05 3.5687e-05 4.9062e-05 2.8450e-05 1.4764e-05 3.5386e-05 1.4924e-05 6.5292e-07
Loss: 55.1 dB QµaµbD0,D1 Q
µaνb
D0,D1
Q
µaωb
D0,D1
Q
νaµb
D0,D1
Q
νaνb
D0,D1
Q
νaωb
D0,D1
Q
ωaµb
D0,D1
Q
ωaνb
D0,D1
Q
ωaωb
D0,D1
D0 = 1, D1 = 0 6.8058e-05 4.1643e-05 3.4735e-05 4.1441e-05 1.4647e-05 7.6051e-06 3.4506e-05 7.7697e-06 7.1022e-07
D0 = 0, D1 = 1 6.7805e-05 4.1456e-05 3.4536e-05 4.1285e-05 1.4385e-05 7.3280e-06 3.4249e-05 7.5584e-06 6.2038e-07
TABLE III: Experimentally observed gains QabD0,D1 of the signals in the Z basis for the four different values of the overall system loss, 38.0
dB, 46.7 dB, 49.4 dB and 55.1 dB, with a, b ∈ {µ, ν, ω} and (D0, D1) ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}. Note that a and b refer to Alice’s and Bob’s intensity
respectively.
R10 +R01 minµ,ν,ω R10 +R01 maxµ,ν,ω R10 +R01 PLOB bound
Loss: 38.0 dB 2.6484e-04 1.9917e-04 3.4765e-04 2.2867e-04
Loss: 46.7 dB 7.8389e-05 6.9058e-05 8.8458e-05 3.0845e-05
Loss: 49.4 dB 3.6306e-05 2.4061e-05 5.4130e-05 1.6564e-05
Loss: 55.1 dB 1.7542e-05 1.0516e-05 2.5652e-05 4.4584e-06
TABLE IV: Secret key rate given by Eq. (1) for the four different values of the overall system loss considered, 38.0 dB, 46.7 dB, 49.4 dB and
55.1 dB. For each value of the system loss, this Table includes three cases, i.e. the case where intensity fluctuations are disregarded and the
worst and best case scenarios where intensity fluctuations are taken into account. These three cases are indicated in the table with the notation
R10 + R01, minµ,ν,ω R10 + R01 and maxµ,ν,ω R10 + R01, respectively. They refer respectively, to the quantities Rmean, Rmin and Rmax
presented in the main text. Also, for comparison purposes, this table includes the PLOB bound [3]. See the text for further details.
